In preparation for launch, PegaSys Teku is now seeking an external security assessment of the Teku Ethereum 2.0 codebase.
PegaSys has been a huge supporter of Ethereum 2.0 development since its early days. On the one hand, we have R&D teams pushing back the boundaries on several fronts. On the other, we have created one of the leading Ethereum 2.0 client implementations, Teku.
Teku is written in Java, with an Apache 2 license, and is a full implementation of the Eth2 Phase 0 specification, the Proof of Stake beacon chain. Once the beacon chain is launched, holders of ETH will be able to lock up stakes and participate in securing the chain by running validators such as Teku, for which they will receive in-protocol staking rewards.
The launch of the Eth2 beacon chain is now only a small number of months away, and we are working hard to ensure that Teku will be production-ready in good time. Teku has already successfully participated in all three public Eth2 multi-client testnets to date, Witti, Schlesi and Altona, alongside client implementations from other teams.
As part of our preparations for launch, we are now seeking an external security assessment of the Teku codebase. The security of all Eth2 clients is paramount: downtime will cause stakers to lose stake through penalties; loss of keys can cause a loss of stake through being slashed. Maximum uptime, maximum correctness, and a high degree of security are vital.
If your team has experience in reviewing large Java codebases, distributed peer-to-peer systems such as blockchains, advanced cryptographic constructs such as BLS signatures, and has a first-class security background, then we would warmly invite you to respond to our RFP for a security assessment of Teku. In-depth knowledge of Ethereum 2.0 is not required, but could be an advantage.
Please see our Request for Proposals document for all the details and information on how to reply to the RFP. The closing date for responses is 23:59 UTC on Monday 3rd August 2020.
We look forward to hearing from you!
Originally published at https://consensys.net.